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MAY A STATE INTRODUCE INCRIMINATING
STATEMENTS MADE BY A DEFENDANT AS A RESULT OF
PROMISES IN A PLEA BARGAIN AGREEMENT IF THE
DEFENDANT BREACHES THAT AGREEMENT?
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INTRODUCTION

P

lea bargaining is a central feature of the American criminal justice
system; in most jurisdictions over eighty per cent of all convictions
are obtained through guilty pleas.! Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 2 is intended to facilitate plea bargaining by provid-

* Associate, Murtha, Cullina, Richter and Pinney, Hartford, Connecticut. J.D., Yale
University (1987); Editor, Yale Law Journal.
1 In the federal district courts, 81% of the criminal convictions obtained in fiscal year
1982 were based on guilty pleas. Note, Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and the Breach ofPlea
Agreements, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 142 n.1 (1987); Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 652 n.1 (1981). "It is commonly estimated that 90% of all
criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas." Id.
2 Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in part that:
lElvidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of
an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime,
or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing
pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the
person who made the plea or offer.
The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 11(e)(6) are reprinted in 62 F.R.D. 286 (1974). These
notes clearly show that a major purpose of the Rule is to facilitate plea bargaining by
encouraging frank negotiations. See United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677,682-86 (D.C. Cir.
423
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ing certain protections to defendants who seek a deal with the federal
government. First, the rule encourages frank negotiations by prohibiting
government prosecutors from using incriminating admissions made to
them by a defendant if the parties fail to reach an agreement. 3 Second,
the rule forbids the government from using incriminating admissions
made by a defendant in open court while he is entering a guilty plea if a
court later grants him permission to withdraw his plea. 4 Many states in
their rules of evidence or criminal procedure provide similar protections. 5
This Article is concerned with situations in which a defendant intentionally breaches a plea agreement. This problem usually occurs when a
plea agreement requires a defendant to testify against his accomplices in
exchange for a lesser sentence. Some plea agreements require a defendant to testify against his alleged accomplices before he is permitted to
plead guilty to a lesser charge; other bargains allow a defendant to plead
guilty before he is obligated to testify.6 A defendant can breach either
type of agreement by: (1) committing perjury; (2) refusing to testify at an
important stage of the proceedings, even if he has testified at an earlier
hearing; or (3) refusing to plead guilty to the charge specified in the plea
agreement and demanding a trial on the charges. 7 Federal and state
courts have split over the question of whether their respective rules of
evidence or criminal procedure prohibit prosecutors from introducing
incriminating admissions made pursuant to a plea agreement where a
defendant has intentionally breached that bargain. s It should be noted
that this problem arises only where a defendant unilaterally breaks the

1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967 (1980); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 730-32 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (discussing Rule 11(e)(6)). Rule 410 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence is virtually identical to Rule 11(e)(6).
3 See supra note 2.
4 United States v. Udeagu, 110 F.R.D. 172, 173-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
5 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG, EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 20 (1987)
(thirty states have adopted rules similar to Rule 11(e)(6».
6 See, e.g., Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S. Ct. 2680 (1987) (defendant entered guilty plea
before he was required to testify against accomplices). Cf. People v. Conte, 421 Mich.
704, 718-21, 365 N.W.2d 648,652-53 (1984) (this case involved five consolidated appeals. In
one case, the defendant Norman was required to testify before being allowed to enter a
guilty plea).
7 Compare Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S. Ct. 2680, 2683 (1987) (defendant refused to
testify at retrial of his accomplices) with People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 718-21, 365 N .E.2d
648, 652-53 (1984) (defendant refused to plead guilty to the charge agreed upon in his plea
agreement and demanded a jury trial). Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure specifically allows statements made in connection with plea negotiations to be
used in a criminal proceeding for perjury. See United States v. Gleason, 766 F.2d 1239,1245
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
8 See infra notes 33-87 and accompanying text.
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agreement without permission of the court; a different analysis would
apply if the government, as well as the defendant, were at fault. 9
There is a substantial constitutional question concerning whether
admissions made pursuant to a plea bargain that the defendant has
breached are admissible under the fifth amendment's privilege against
compelled self-incrimination or the due process clauses of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Courts have reached conflicting results in
regard to whether such statements are voluntary.lo This Article argues
that it is difficult to resolve whether such admissions are voluntary
because courts have not provided a clear definition as to under what
circumstances a confession is voluntary in accordance with the dictates of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Instead of focusing on whether these types of admissions are voluntary,
it may be more fruitful to ask whether a defendant can waive his right to
exclude involuntary admissions by intentionally breaching a plea agreement. In Ricketts v. Adamson,ll the United States Supreme Court
recently held that a defendant under certain circumstances can waive his
rights under the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause by intentionally breaching a plea agreement. This Article concludes that the waiver
analysis in Ricketts may be applied to confessions made in connection
with an aborted plea bargain and that even involuntary confessions may
be used against a defendant who intentionally breaches a plea agreement
that contains a written waiver clause to that effect.

II.

REMEDIES FOR BROKEN PLEA AGREEMENTS

A prosecutor has a number of options if a defendant intentionally
breaches a plea agreement. Rule 11(e)(6) clearly allows the federal
government to prosecute for perjury a defendant who breaks a plea
bargain by lying instead of providing the truthful testimony that is the
implied or express condition of every bargain. 12 If a defendant fails to
provide testimony required under the terms of his plea agreement and
has not yet entered a guilty plea, a judge can refuse to enforce the
government's obligations under the bargain.l 3 In Ricketts v. Adamson,14

9 Under some circumstances a defendant can demand specific performance of the
government's obligations in a plea agreement. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
This Article is not concerned with situations in which a prosecutor breaches a plea
agreement.
10 See infra notes 33-87 and accompanying text.
II 107 S. Ct. 2680 (1987).
12 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6).
13 See, e.g., United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 179 (1st Cir. 1985) (government
is not required to fulfill a plea bargain when a defendant acts in bad faith).
14 107 S. Ct. 2680 (1987).
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the United States Supreme Court held that a state may reindict a
defendant on more serious charges ifhe substantially breaches his duties
under a plea agreement even after he has entered a guilty plea, been
sentenced, and begun to serve a prison term. In the wake of the Ricketts
decision, a key question is whether a state may introduce, in a subsequent trial as substantive evidence, incriminating admissions made by a
defendant during plea negotiations if he intentionally breaches his plea
agreement. It should be noted that if a defendant simply decides not to
enter into a plea agreement after engaging in some preliminary negotiations, Rule 11(e)(6) prohibits the federal government from using any
incriminating admissions even for impeachment,15 although some states
allow such statements to be used for that limited purpose.1 6 Prosecutors
have a number of potential remedies if a defendant walks out of a plea
bargain; however, it is unclear whether a state can use the best evidence
of all, a defendant's confession of guilt during plea negotiations.

III.

PLEA BARGAINS, CONFESSIONS AND VOLUNTARINESS

The United States Supreme Court has failed to provide a consistent
explanation of which circumstances make a confession voluntary under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. On one hand, the Court has
stated that a confession is involuntary if it is induced by the slightest
promise ofleniency.l7 On the other hand, the Court has sanctioned a plea
bargaining system in which guilty pleas are exchanged for promises of
leniency.l8
In 1897, the United States Supreme Court in Bram v. United States 19
reversed Bram's murder conviction on the ground that his statements to
a detective were involuntary. The detective had forced Bram to strip off
all clothing and then had interrogated him.20 In the course of its
discussion, the Bram Court set forth the following rule:
But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and
voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or
violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence. . . . A
confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner

See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 683 F.2d 688, 690-93 (2d Cir. 1982).
Compare Williams v. State, 491 A.2d 1129 (Del.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 824 (1985)
(state may impeach defendant with false statement made during plea negotiations) with
Gillum v. State, 681 P.2d 87 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984) (state may not impeach defendant with
prior inconsistent statement made during plea negotiations).
17 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
18 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
19 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
20 ld at 542-43.
15
16
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has been influenced by any threat or promise; for the law cannot
measure the force of the influence used, or decide its effect upon
the mind ofthe prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if
any degree of influence has been exerted. 21
While Bram is an old case, it has never been overruled and its test is
frequently applied in cases in which a criminal defendant claims that his
confession was involuntary.22
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. United States 23
sought to reconcile the Bram test with the widespread practice of plea
bargaining. The Brady Court distinguished confessions induced by promises that were made in the presence of counsel from those admissions
made by defendants who lacked the advice of counsel, and, therefore,
were especially likely to be influenced by promises of leniency.

Bram is not inconsistent with our holding that Brady's plea
was not compelled even though the law promised him a lesser
maximum penalty if he did not go to trial. Bram dealt with a
confession given by a defendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel. In such circumstances, even a mild promise of
leniency was deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because
the promise was an illegal act as such, but because the defendants
at such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible
impact on them [is] too great to ignore and too difficult to assess.
But Bram and its progeny did not hold that the possibly coercive
impact of a promise of leniency could not be dissipated by the
presence and advice of counsel, any more than Miranda v.
Arizona ... held that the possibly coercive atmosphere of the
police station could not be counteracted by the presence of counsel
or other safeguards. 24
The counsel versus no counsel distinction employed in Brady makes sense
to a certain extent, but does not answer all questions concerning whether
a confession induced by a plea bargain is voluntary. Under Brady, a
guilty plea entered in open court upon the advice of counsel is considered
voluntary.25 Brady is less helpful, however, in explaining under what
circumstances the state may use incriminating admissions if a plea

ld. (emphasis added).
The Bram test for determining the voluntariness of a confession was cited with
approval in the following cases. See, e.g., Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28,30 (1976); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1970); United States v. Grant, 622 F.2d 308, 316 (8th
Cir. 1980); Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932
(1979).
23 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
24 ld at 753-54.
251d.
21

22
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bargain is not completed. Brady could be read to permit the government
to use any admission made by a defendant in plea negotiations against
him as long as he was represented by counsel. Rule 11(e)(6) in a sense
mutes the potential conflict between Brady and Bram by excluding
admissions made during plea negotiations, despite the presence of
defense counsel, as a means of encouraging such bargaining. 26 Brady did
not resolve whether a confession which would not have been made but for
a plea agreement can truly be viewed as voluntary.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court in Hutto v. Ross27 was again
able to avoid resolving the potential conflict between the Bram test and
the practical realities of plea bargaining. In Hutto, the defendant, with
the assistance of counsel, reached a plea agreement with an Arkansas
prosecutor; it is important to note that the bargain did not require the
defendant to give a confession. 28 The prosecutor later asked the defendant's counsel whether the defendant would be willing to make a
statement concerning the crimes committed. 29 "Although counsel advised
respondent of his Fifth Amendment privilege and informed him that the
terms of the negotiated plea bargain were available regardless of his
willingness to comply with the prosecuting attorney's request, the
respondent agreed to make a statement confessing to the crime
charged."30 The Hutto Court rejected the defendant's argument that
Bram prohibited the admission of a confession that would not have been
made but for a plea bargain. 31 Hutto adopted a more restrictive interpretation of Bram, albeit one that was reasonably plausible. The Court
concluded that the defendant's confession was voluntary even under the
Bram test because the prosecutor had not promised the defendant any
benefit in exchange for the statement. 32 Hutto was an easy case for a
Supreme Court that was apparently eager to maintain the fiction that
plea bargaining was really compatible with traditional standards concerning the voluntariness of confessions. The Court has never addressed
the much tougher issue of whether a confession required as a condition of
a plea agreement is voluntary.
IV.

BROKEN PLEA BARGAINS, CONFESSIONS AND VOLUNTARINESS

Courts have split over whether a state may use incriminating statements made by a defendant as a condition of a plea agreement where he

26
27
28
29
30
31

32

See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
429 U.s. 428 (1976).
Id at 428-31[d. at 28.
[d. at 28-29.
[d. at 30.
[d.
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deliberately breaks that bargain. A key issue has been whether courts
should apply the strict Bram per se standard or a totality of the
circumstances test to determine the voluntariness of admissions under
these circumstances. Should courts focus on the fact that the plea
agreement required the defendant to make incriminating admissions, or
upon circumstances such as whether the defendant initiated plea negotiations, confessed in open court or voluntarily backed out of his obligations under the agreement? Good arguments can be made for both points
of view since the concept of voluntariness is not easily defined. This
Article argues that the voluntariness of a confession induced by an
aborted plea agreement may not be determinative. The real question may
be whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to challenge the admissibility of such statements.

A. Involuntary Statements
In Gunsby v. Wainwright,33 Gunsby, a habeas corpus petitioner, had
entered into a plea agreement with the State of Florida under which
he agreed to plead guilty to robbery and testify against two
co-defendants in exchange for a reduced sentence. "Shortly after
entering the guilty plea, Gunsby made a statement to the prosecutor in
which he incriminated himself and a codefendant. Gunsby's testimony at
trial, however, tended to exculpate the codefendant, who was
acquitted."34 After a contested hearing, a Florida trial court vacated the
plea agreement on the ground that he had breached his bargain by
making inconsistent statements. 35 In addition, the trial court ruled that
the incriminating admission that Gunsby made in his first statement
was admissible and, as such, was introduced during his subsequent
robbery triaJ.36 The Florida Appellate Court affirmed his robbery
conviction. 37 A federal district court granted his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 3S The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in part and vacated it in
part.39 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the incriminating statement
made by Gunsby as a result of promises in the aborted plea agreement
was involuntary and inadmissible in light of Hutto. 40 One may

33 596 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932 (1979).
'4 Id. at 655.
35Id.
36Id.
37 Id.
38 Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932 (1979).
39 [d. at 655-58.
40 [d. at 655-56.
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reasonably infer that the Fifth Circuit was applying the Bram test
discussed in Hutto. 41
In addition, the Fifth Circuit concluded that another statement made
by Gunsby was involuntary and inadmissible. After Florida prosecutors
had sought to vacate his plea agreement, but before a hearing was held
on the matter, "Gunsby appeared at a deposition in response to a
subpoena issued by another codefendant who had not yet been tried.
Gunsby again incriminated himself."42 This statement was introduced
during Gunsby's robbery trial. A federal district court concluded that this
statement was involuntary under theBram test because Gunsby believed
that he had to testify at the deposition in order to save his plea
agreement. 43 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination
that this statement was involuntary. "At no time was he advised, as in
Hutto, that he need not testify in order to retain the benefits of the plea
bargain should the court refuse to nullify it, or that the State would not
use his refusal to testify as additional ground for the motion to set aside
the plea bargain."44 The Fifth Circuit, however, vacated an order by the
district court prohibiting an increased sentence if Gunsby should be
convicted after a new trial on the robbery charge because the facts
concerning his post-sentencing conduct were not known. 45 The Fifth
Circuit in Gunsby essentially applied the Bram test where a defendant
had failed to fulfill his obligations under a plea agreement. 46 According to
the Gunsby court, Hutto was a narrow exception to the rule that
admissions made as a result of promises in a plea bargain are involuntary.47
In People v. Conte,48 the Michigan Supreme Court was divided over
whether the state could introduce incriminating statements made by the
defendant Norman as a result of a plea bargain where he deliberately
broke that agreement. Norman had been convicted by ajury in a separate
case of first-degree murder and robbery; Bobby Jacks was the victim in
that case. 49 While in jail awaiting sentencing, Norman sent a letter to the
prosecutor's office in which he claimed that he had valuable information

41 See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28,30 (1976) (applying the voluntariness test in Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)).
42 Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932 (1979).
43 [d. at 656-58.
44 [d.
45 [d. at 658.
46 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
47 See Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654, 655-56 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 932
(1979).
48 421 Mich. 704, 365 NW.2d 648 (1984) (People v. Norman was consolidated with four
other appeals that were reported with People v. Conte).
49 [d. at 718.
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concerning other crimes. 50 He later reached a plea agreement with the
state in which he agreed to testify against his accomplice in the River
Rouge jewelry store murders in exchange for the state's promise that he
would be allowed to plead guilty to a single count of second-degree
murder, instead of being charged with four counts of felony murder and
one count of armed robbery.51 In addition, the state promised that after
Norman had testified at his accomplice's trial, it would permit dismissal
of the first-degree murder conviction in the Jacks case and allow him to
plead guilty to one count of second-degree murder in that matter.52 In
accordance with the terms ofthe plea agreement, Norman made a written
statement in which he implicated himself and an accomplice, Reginald
Johnson, in the robbery of the River Rouge jewelry store and the murder
of four people during the course of the robbery. 53 Norman then testified
against Johnson at the latter's preliminary hearing. 54 Norman admitted
in open court that he personally had killed all four victims. 55 Subsequently, Norman refused to plead guilty to second-degree murder in the
River Rouge jewelry store murders and sought a jury trial in that case. 56
One may note that his action in this regard made little sense because he
was already serving a long sentence for the Jacks' murder, and, therefore,
would have remained incarcerated even if he had been acquitted of the
jewelry store murders.57 The inCUlpatory admissions made by Norman
during Johnson's preliminary hearing were introduced during the former's trial.5 8 A jury convicted Norman of four counts of first-degree murder
and one count of armed robbery.59
Four of the seven justices on the Michigan Supreme Court held that
Norman's statement was inadmissible. 60 Three of the justices in the
majority took the view that under the Michigan constitution an inculpatory admission "induced by a law enforcement official's promise of
leniency is involuntary and inadmissible."61 They contended that the

Id. at 718·19.
Id. at 719.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55Id.
56Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 718-19.
60 Id. at 747-48, 759-61, 762-63. Justices Cavanagh and Levin joined Chief Justice
Williams' opinion to affirm the decision of the Michigan Court of Appeals, which had
reversed Norman's conviction. Justice Cavanagh, in a separate opinion, also voted to affirm
the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justices Ryan and Brickley joined Justice Boyle's
dissenting opinion in which he argued that the statements made by Norman during his plea
negotiations were properly admitted during his subsequent trial.
61 Id. at 749-50 (opinion of Chief Justice Williams).
50

51
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Bram test should be applied where a defendant is prompted by a promise
to make incriminating admissions, but also stated that it made little
sense to exclude confessions that would have been given even if the state
had made no promises. 62 For the purposes of this Article, it is clear that
these three justices would have concluded that an incriminating statement that is made by a defendant as a requirement of a plea agreement
is involuntary even if he intentionally breaches his obligations under
that bargain. 63 While they did not rely upon the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution, it is evident that the three justices in the
majority would reach the same result under both the federal and the
Michigan Constitution. 64
One justice in the majority declined to hold that Norman's statements
were inadmissible under the Michigan Constitution, but concluded that
these admissions were barred by a Michigan rule of evidence based on
Rule 11(e)(6) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 65
It would be unfair to treat defendants who give statements in
connection with an offer or agreement to plead more harshly than
defendants who actually plead and later withdraw their pleas.
The inability to introduce statements made in a bargaining
session does not place the prosecution in a worse position than it
would have occupied if the defendant had not engaged in plea
bargaining at all. 66
Three justices in the minority contended that the voluntariness of a
confession under both the federal and the Michigan constitutions depended upon the totality of the circumstances. 67 They concluded that
Norman's statement was voluntary.
The bargain was solicited by a sophisticated suitor seeking to
avoid a mandatory life sentence. The statement was not made
while [the] defendant was in custody, but rather was made in
open court. None of the indicators of involuntariness which we
have set forth today are here implicated. We have no doubt that
defendant's testimony was the product of a defendant's free will.6s
Conte is an excellent case for the purposes of this Article because it
presents all three major points of view. First, any confession that is made

62
63

64
65

66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 738·43 (opinion of Chief Justice Williams).
at 721-50 (opinion of Chief Justice Williams).
at
at
at
at

762-63 (opinion of Justice Cavanagh).
763 (opinion of Justice Cavanagh).
750-61 (opinion of Justice Boyle).
760 (opinion of Justice Boyle).
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as a result of promises by the state is involuntary.69 Second, such
statements should be barred as a matter of policy because a defendant
may withdraw from a completed plea bargain and should have the same
right to withdraw a statement made as the result of an aborted plea
bargain. 70 Finally, such statements are voluntary if the defendant
solicited the plea agreement and made his admissions in open court.71
This Article will first examine the policy arguments in this area and
will then discuss the constitutional problem.
B. Policy

There are three main policy arguments for excluding statements made
as a requirement of a plea agreement that a defendant later intentionally
breaches. First, such a defendant should have the same right to withdraw
this type of statement as one who withdraws from a guilty plea that has
been entered in open court.72 A major problem with this point of view is
that a defendant must receive permission from a judge to withdraw a
guilty plea entered in open court and has very limited rights in that
regard. 73 Courts usually disfavor allowing defendants to withdraw a
guilty plea. 74 To the extent that courts seek to facilitate plea bargaining,
they have a strong incentive to discourage defendants from simply
walking out oftheir obligations under a plea agreement.7 5 This argument
is compelling only if a defendant has received permission from a court to
withdraw from a plea agreement and seeks to block the use of statements
made in connection with that agreement. 76

Id.
[d.
[d.
[d.

at 721-50 (opinion of Chief Justice Williams).
at 762-63 (opinion of Justice Cavanagh).
71
at 750-61 (opinion of Justice Boyle).
72
at 762-63 (opinion of Justice Cavanagh).
73
It is well-settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an
accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be
collaterally attacked .... Thus, only when it develops that the defendant was not
fairly apprised of its consequences can his plea be challenged under the due
process clause.
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 504-05 (1984).
74 [d.
75 See United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677,682-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 967 (1980); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 730-32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 824 (1978) (both opinions argued that the judicial system has strong incentive to
discourage defendants from simply breaching plea agreements with impunity). See also
United States v. Doe, 671 F. Supp. 205, 208-09 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Groover v. State, 458 So.2d
226,228 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009 (1985).
76 Courts in their discretion may permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stayton, 408 F.2d 559, 561 (3d Cir. 1969); Paradiso v. United States, 482
F.2d 409, 416 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Swinehart, 614 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1980).
Once a court has allowed a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty the government may not
69

70
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Second, the argument can be made that the inability to introduce
statements made in a bargaining session does not place the prosecution in
a worse position than it would have occupied if the defendant had not
engaged in plea bargaining at all. 77 It is possible, however, that the
sudden withdrawal of a defendant from a plea agreement may harm a
state's chance of winning a conviction because the prosecutor may not be
prepared to try the defendant before a jury. The resulting delays may be
to the defendant's advantage. 7s The main problem with this policy
argument is that, standing alone, it is not very compelling. Why should
the state not be able to use reliable evidence to establish the truth in a
case? This argument is much stronger if it is combined with the
contention that such admissions are involuntary or discourage defendants from negotiating plea bargains.
Finally, there is the argument that the practice of allowing a state to
introduce statements made by a defendant as a condition of a plea
bargain that he later breached might discourage future defendants from
engaging in plea negotiations. In United States v. Stirling,79 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Rule 11(e)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not prohibit the introduction
of grand jury testimony made by a defendant as a requirement of a plea
agreement where he later intentionally breached his obligations. The
Stirling court argued that Rule 11(e)(6) was intended by Congress, and
the Advisory Committee that wrote it, to protect the confidentiality of
plea, negotiations, but was never designed to bar admissions made
pursuant to a finalized plea agreement.so In United States v. Davis,81 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that testimony given to a grand jury by the defendant Gelestino pursuant
to a formal plea agreement was admissible where he thereafter withdrew
from the bargain and pleaded not guilty. The Davis court agreed with the
Stirling decision that Rule 11(e)(6) did not apply to statements made after
a plea agreement is reached. 82 "Excluding testimony made after-and

use any statements made by him during plea negotiations. United States v. Udeagu, 110
FRO. 172, 173-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
77 People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 763, 365 N.w.2d 648, 672 (1984) (opinion of Justice
Cavanagh).
78 Whether a delay in trying a case would work to the advantage of the state or the
defendant would depend on the circumstances surrounding an individual case, and,
accordingly, it is difficult to generalize about what effect a defendant's breach of a plea
agreement would have on the ability of a prosecutor to win a conviction in a subsequent
trial on the same charges.
79 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978).
80 ld at 730-32.
81 617 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 967 (1980) (consolidated appeal
involving the Gelestino case reported under United States v. Davis).
82 ld at 682-86.
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pursuant to-the agreement would not serve the purpose of encouraging
compromise. Indeed, such a rule would permit a defendant to breach his
bargain with impunity .... "83
These three policy arguments against introducing these types of statements have some merit, but they seem rather weak when balanced against
the probative value of such admissions and the unclean hands possessed
by a defendant who breaks his commitments. The constitutional argument
that such statements are involuntary is much more compelling.
C.

What is Voluntariness?

It is very difficult to determine whether a confession is voluntary. The
United States Supreme Court in Bram noted that it is perhaps impossible
to measure the effect of a promise upon a prisoner and, therefore,
developed a per se or bright line rule that any inducement was presumed
to render a resulting confession involuntary.84 On the other hand, some
courts have concluded that a confession is voluntary despite promises by
the state where the defendant solicited or willingly entered into a plea
agreement and then provided testimony in open court. B5 These courts
apply a totality of the circumstances test under which they balance the
coercive impact of the inducements offered by the state against factors
indicating that the confession was the product of the defendant's free will.
A good case can be made for either point of view.
Previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court are not very
helpful in terms of indicating how the Court might apply voluntariness
standards in this area. In Brady and Hutto the Court cited the strict Bram
decision with approval, but did not have occasion to apply its per se test.
In State v. Boyle,86 the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior
Court took the view that the United States Supreme court had effectively
narrowed the scope of the Bram test when it endorsed plea bargaining in
Brady. In Davis,87 the District of Columbia Circuit noted that a per se
application of Bram would mean the total abolition of plea bargaining,
and suggested that a totality of the circumstances test for determining
voluntariness is in accord with Hutto and Brady. One might speculate
about how the Supreme Court would apply voluntariness criteria to a
confession made by a defendant in a plea bargain that he later intentionally breached. It is quite possible, however, that the court might not reach

83

[d. at 685.

168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 682-86 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 967 (1980); United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 677, 682-86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 824 (1978); People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704, 750-61, 365 N.W.2d 648 (1984); State
v. Boyle, 198 N.J.Super. 64, 66-73, 486 A.2d 852 (App. Div. 1984).
86 198 N.J. Super. at 72 n.4, 486 A.2d at 856 n. 4.
87 617 F.2d at 682-86.
84
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the voluntariness issue and would instead conclude that such a defendant
had waived whatever federal due process rights he had possessed to bar
the admission of that confession in a subsequent trial.
V.

BROKEN PLEA BARGAINS AND CONSTITUTIONAL WAIVER

A. Ricketts v. Adamson
In Ricketts v. Adamson,88 the United States Supreme Court recently
held that a defendant in some circumstances may waive his double
jeopardy rights under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment, by
breaching a plea agreement. The Court concluded that a state may
reindict a defendant on more serious charges if he substantially breaches
his obligations under a plea agreement even after he had pleaded guilty
to a lesser included offense, been sentenced, and begun to serve a prison
term. 89
The State of Arizona brought first-degree murder charges against John
Adamson. 9o Arizona officials and Adamson reached an agreement
whereby he would be allowed to plead guilty to second-degree murder in
exchange for his testimony against other parties involved in the
murder.91 The agreement specified that he would receive a nominal
prison term of between forty-eight and forty-nine years, and would
actually serve twenty years and two months.92 Adamson testified against
his accomplices during their first trials, but refused to testify against
them again when they were retried on the same charges after the Arizona
Supreme Court had reversed their initial convictions,93 He maintained
that the plea agreement did not explicitly require him to testify at a
retrial, and also claimed that any obligations he had under the bargain to
testify terminated when he was sentenced. 94 Adamson told Arizona
officials that he would testify at the retrials only if they agreed to certain
conditions, among others, that the state release him immediately after he
had provided testimony. 95 His defense counsel acknowledged in a letter to
state officials that they might consider his refusal to testify to represent
a breach of the agreement, and that they might attempt to reinstate
first-degree murder charges against him.96

88
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90

107 S. Ct. 2680, 2682-86 (1987).
[d.
[d. at 2682.

92

[d.
[d.
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93

[d. at 2683.

94

[d.

95

[d.
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[d.

at 2686-87.
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Arizona prosecutors did in fact file a new information charging Adamson with first-degree murder.97 Adamson filed an interlocutory appeal to
bar his prosecution. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the state could
reinstate this charge. 98 Adamson then offered to testify at the retrials,
but state prosecutors declined his offer. 99 Adamson was convicted of
first-degree murder, and was subsequently sentenced to death.1° o The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc,
held that his prosecution violated double jeopardy principles, and directed the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. WI Judge, now Justice,
Anthony Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion in which he argued that
Adamson's double jeopardy rights had not been violated.l° 2 The United
States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a five to four decision
written by Justice White.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Ricketts agreed that
under certain circumstances a state may reindict a defendant who has
substantially breached his obligations pursuant to a plea agreement. The
central dispute that divided the majority and minority concerned the
extent to which a plea agreement must explicitly warn a defendant that
a violation of its terms can effect a waiver of his double jeopardy rights.
Justice White in his majority opinion concluded that the plea agreement between Adamson and Arizona had clearly provided that the state
could reindict him if he refused to testify against his accomplices.
Paragraph five of the agreement stated that if Adamson failed to testify,
"this entire agreement is null and void and the original charge will be
automatically reinstated."103 Paragraph fifteen provided: "In the event
this agreement becomes null and void, then the parties shall be returned
to the positions they were in before this agreement."I04 The majority
rejected the contention of the dissenters that double jeopardy rights can
be waived only if they are specifically waived by name in the plea
agreement.1 05 Justice White argued that an "agreement specifying that

ld. at 2683.
ld. at 2683-84.
99 ld. at 2684.
100 ld.
101 Adamson v. Ricketts, 789 F.2d 722 (9th Cir. 1986) (en bane), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 2680
(1987). For a discussion of this decision see Note, Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and the
Breach of Plea Agreements, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 142 (1987).
102 Adamson v. Ricketts, 789 F.2d at 747·50 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
voted with the majority of five that reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that Adamson's
double jeopardy rights had not been violated. Thus, the retirement of Justice Powell and his
replacement by Justice Kennedy would not have affected the outcome of this case in the
Supreme Court.
103 Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S. Ct. 2680, 2685 (1987).
104 ld.
105 ld. at 2685-86, 88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97
98
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charges may be reinstated given certain circumstances is, at least under
the provisions of this plea agreement, precisely equivalent to an agreement waiving a double jeopardy defense."lo6
Justice Brennan in his dissent did not dispute the proposition that
under some circumstances a defendant may waive his double jeopardy
rights by breaching a plea agreement. He did argue, however, that a plea
agreement must "contain an explicit waiver of all double jeopardy
protection."107 His dissent contended that an implicit waiver of double
jeopardy rights in a plea agreement was insufficient to meet the constitutional standard of a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver."108

B. Ricketts and Confessions
A major question left unanswered by the Ricketts decision is whether a
defendant can waive other types of constitutional rights by signing and
then breaching a plea agreement. There is a considerable possibility that
prosecutors will insert waiver clauses concerning confessions in the wake
of Ricketts, which makes it easier for a state to reindict a defendant who
walks out of a plea bargain. Obviously, a prosecutor would seek to use
any statements made by a defendant like Adamson in connection with a
broken plea bargain in a subsequent prosecution. Thus, it is likely that
courts in the near future will confront the question of whether waiver
clauses in plea agreements may apply to confessions made as a result of
promises made by the state.
It is difficult to predict what courts will hold when confronted with a
new issue, but it is likely that courts will extend the waiver analysis in
Ricketts to confessions made as a condition of a plea bargain which the
defendant later intentionally breaks. The strongest argument against the
admission of such statements is that they are involuntary. There are two
arguments that can be made in favor of introducing these types of
admissions. First, a defendant may waive important constitutional rights
by signing a plea agreement if the waiver is "knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.,,109 It is possible, of course, that courts might conclude that the
fifth amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination is
more fundamental than its double jeopardy provisions, and, therefore,
cannot be waived in a plea agreement. In Boykin v. Alabama,llo however,
the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant may waive his
fifth amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination by knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering a guilty plea in open court.
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107
108
109
110

ld. at 2686 (emphasis added).
ld. at 2688 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
ld. at 2687-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969),
395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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In Mabry v. Johnson,lll the Court concluded "that plea agreements are
consistent with the requirements of voluntariness and intelligencebecause each side may obtain advantages when a guilty plea is exchanged for sentencing concessions, the agreement is no less voluntary
than any bargained-for exchange." Thus, despite the traditional reluctance of courts to admit confessions that are obtained through promises of
leniency, it is quite possible that at least some courts might conclude that
a defendant may waive his right against compelled self-incrimination by
signing a waiver clause in a plea agreement. As the five to four split in
Ricketts demonstrated, the clarity of a waiver clause will be an important
factor in determining whether a defendant has knowingly, intelligently
and voluntarily waived a right by entering into a plea agreement.1l2
Second, the majority opinion in Ricketts emphasized that Adamson had
made a voluntary choice in refusing to comply with the terms of this plea
agreement. 113
He could submit to the State's request that he testify at the
retrial . . . or he could stand on his interpretation of the
agreement, knowing that if he were wrong, his breach of the
agreement would restore the parties to their original positions
and he could be prosecuted for first-degree murder.11 4
A defendant who simply walks out of a plea agreement instead of
receiving judicial permission to withdraw from its terms is less likely to
convince a court that a valid waiver clause should not be enforced on
equitable grounds and that he should be allowed a second chance to fulfill
his obligations.
On the other hand, a court might decline to apply the Ricketts rationale
to a confession made as a condition of a plea agreement that a defendant
later intentionally breaches. In Ricketts the only means the state had to
force Adamson to testify, after he had entered a guilty plea and been
sentenced, was the threat of reindicting him, although one may question
the prosecution's decision to proceed even after he had expressed his
willingness to testify at the retriaJ.1l5 The state is in no worse position if
it can reindict a defendant, but cannot use the statements made by the
defendant as a requirement of the agreement. U6 In addition, there are

467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984).
Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S. Ct. 2680, 2687·91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113 Id. at 2686.
114 Id.
115 Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion suggested that the decision of Arizona
prosecutors to abandon prosecution of Adamson's two alleged accomplices, Dunlap and
Robinson, in favor of prosecuting Adamson at a time when he had offered to testify at their
potential retrials raised the possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id. at 2692 n.13.
116 But see note 78 and accompanying text.
111
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the traditional arguments in Bram and its progeny that all confessions
obtained in part through promises by the state are potentially involuntary and, therefore, violate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination and due process. 117
It is possible that courts will not extend the waiver analysis in Ricketts
to confessions. This author would predict, however, that the five Justices
on the Supreme Court who concluded that Adamson could be reindicted
and sentenced to death because of the waiver clauses in his plea
agreement would apply the same reasoning to confessions made as a
condition of a plea bargain despite the arguments in the previous
paragraph.1 1B A defendant who signs a plea agreement with a waiver
clause concerning confessions would be well-advised to ponder Adamson's
fate before walking out of his obligations under that contract.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts have reshaped legal doctrine to conform to the realities of plea
bargaining. Bram v. United States declared that the slightest promise
rendered a confession involuntary,l19 Seventy-three years later, the
Supreme Court endorsed plea bargaining in Brady v. United States.I 20
That court avoided the issue of whether plea bargaining is inconsistent
with the Bram voluntariness test by concluding that Brady had knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right against compelled
self-incrimination.121 Ricketts was in some ways a logical, if extreme,
extension of this waiver analysis, and even Justice Brennan in his
dissenting opinion conceded that under some circumstances a defendant
may waive important constitutional protections such as the prohibition
against double jeopardy by signing and then breaching a plea agreement.
This Article has suggested that courts may next apply waiver analysis to
confessions made as a condition of a plea agreement that a defendant
later unilaterally breaches. Whether defendants should be permitted to
waive important constitutional rights pursuant to a plea agreement is a
question that would require analysis beyond the scope of this Article.

117 See People v. Conte, 421 Mich. 704,721-50,365 N.E.2d 648, 650-67 (1987) (opinion of
Chief Justice Williams), for an excellent discussion of Bram and subsequent decisions
concerning the standard for determining whether a confession is voluntary.
us It is difficult to predict how the United States Supreme Court will resolve a new issue.
This author believes that the waiver analysis in Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S. Ct. 2680
(1987), could easily be extended from double jeopardy rights to confessions.
119 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
120 397 U.S. 742, 754 (1970).
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